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  Abstract 
Credit constraints are more frequent among growth companies with large investment 
opportunities. For the same reason, profit taxes may harm innovative firms more than 
standard ones. This paper develops a model of heterogeneous firms where an endogenous 
share opts for innovation and faces credit constraints in the subsequent expansion phase. 
We emphasize four results: (i) R&D subsidies not only encourage innovation but also relax 
finance constraints and help innovative firms to exploit investment opportunities to a larger 
extent. (ii) Taxes which are neutral in a neoclassical world, still restrict expansion investment 
of constrained firms by reducing free cash-flow and thereby discourage innovation. (iii) A 
revenue neutral increase in profit taxes to finance larger R&D subsidies redistributes 
towards innovative firms and boosts aggregate productivity and welfare. (iv) A revenue 
neutral tax cut cum base broadening policy similarly boosts innovation and welfare. 
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G32, G38, H25. 
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 1 Introduction
Growth opportunities are distributed unevenly in the business sector. Empirical evidence
suggests a heterogeneity of ﬁrms along several dimensions and points to three important
characteristics. First, small entrepreneurial companies are often very dynamic and more
innovative than more mature ﬁrms. The innovative nature of their business model creates
large investment opportunities. Second, the growth prospects of these ﬁrms depend on
the technological know-how and managerial eﬀort of a dominating entrepreneur. And
third, young growth companies tend to have little own assets either because they are at
an early stage of their life-cycle or because own resources have been drained at an early
stage by substantial spending on R&D (research and development). The combination of
these characteristics, i.e. large investment opportunities, little own resources and potential
moral hazard with respect to entrepreneurial eﬀort, makes it likely that these ﬁrms face
credit constraints. Compared to innovative ﬁrms, other less dynamic companies pursue
more standard and mature concepts and, as a consequence, have less potential to invest
and grow. These ﬁrms are less likely to face restrictions in external ﬁnancing.
A large empirical literature emphasizes the prevalence and importance of credit con-
straints. Rajan and Zingales (1998) document important sectoral diﬀerences in the ex-
ternal ﬁnancial dependence of ﬁrms. Accordingly, ﬁnancial sector development stimulates
mostly the expansion of ﬁnancially dependent sectors relative to other sectors. In gen-
eral, young and small ﬁrms are more likely to be credit constrained than large ﬁrms (cf.
Schaller, 1993; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 1996; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Mak-
simovic, 2005; Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007). Both ﬁrm entry and subsequent ﬁrm
growth are limited by ﬁnancial frictions (see Hubbard, 1998; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt,
2006; Aghion et al., 2007). Furthermore, empirical research commonly ﬁnds that inno-
vative ﬁrms face tighter ﬁnancing restrictions than non-innovative ﬁrms (Guiso, 1998;
Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005; Ughetto, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2009). With these classes
of ﬁrms most strongly aﬀected, ﬁnancial constraints are not only important at the ﬁrm
level but are likely to slow down macroeconomic performance as well. Young and inno-
1vative ﬁrms have emerged as an important source of economic growth (Audretsch, 2002;
Carree and Thurik, 2003). These ﬁrms are fast in adopting and developing new technolo-
gies or products, and consequently grow at a faster pace than larger established ﬁrms.
Despite their small initial size, they contribute signiﬁcantly to aggregate employment and
productivity growth (cf. Roper, 1997; Audretsch, 2002). Kortum and Lerner (2000) at-
tribute in 1998 roughly 14% of U.S. industrial innovation to young venture capital backed
ﬁrms although they spend only about 3% of total R&D funds.
This paper explores how tax policy may inﬂuence innovation and aggregate invest-
ment when ﬁrms are heterogeneous and expansion investment of innovative companies is
constrained by the availability of external funding. This endeavor is likely to be impor-
tant since empirical research suggests that constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms respond
in an entirely diﬀerent way to proﬁt taxation. According to neoclassical theory, taxes
aﬀect investment of unconstrained ﬁrms exclusively by their impact on the user cost of
capital (e.g. Hall and Jorgensen, 1967; Auerbach, 1983). Hassett and Hubbard (2002)
review the empirical literature and report estimates of investment elasticities with respect
to user cost in the range between -0.5 and -1.0. In contrast, investment becomes sensitive
to cash-ﬂow and own collateral when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained (see Hubbard, 1998,
for a survey). Schaller (1993), Chirinko and Schaller (1995) and Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1991) report elasticities of physical capital investment to cash-ﬂow around
0.4-0.5. Estimates for total working capital are signiﬁcantly higher and vary between 0.8
to 1.3 (see Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; and Carpenter and
Petersen, 2002). The user cost of capital — and thereby the marginal eﬀective tax rate —
is not important for constrained ﬁrms since they are unable to invest up to the eﬃcient
scale which would equate the return on investment to the user cost. In fact, because
these ﬁrms are constrained, they earn an excess return on top of the user cost. For these
reasons, neutral tax systems such as cash-ﬂow taxes or an ACE system (allowance for
corporate equity) cannot be neutral if at least part of ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained (see
Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2009).1 Although these tax systems have no impact on the user
1The ACE system was proposed by the Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991)
2cost, they still retard investment of constrained ﬁrms by reducing free cash-ﬂow. Given
that ﬁnance constrained ﬁrms are often the most innovative ones, it seems important to
explore how tax policy can endogenously aﬀect not only investment scale but also the
share of constrained ﬁrms and, thereby, aggregate innovation.
To investigate these issues, we propose a theoretical model where innovative ﬁrms
face credit constraints. In a ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide whether to make a discrete R&D
investment or not. This decision margin endogenously explains the composition of the
business sector between innovative and standard ﬁrms and, depending on the shares of
these ﬁrms, aggregate productivity. The R&D investment has two consequences: it boosts
productivity and, thereby, creates larger investment opportunities of innovating ﬁrms in
the subsequent expansion stage. It also drains internal resources relative to standard
ﬁr m sw h i c ha b s t a i nf r o mR & Da n dr e m a i nw i t hl o w e rp r o d u c t i v i t y .B o t hc o n s e q u e n c e s
make it likely that innovative growth companies face credit constraints in the subsequent
expansion phase. Subsequent to the innovation decision, ﬁrms are heterogeneous with
respect to investment opportunities. Standard ﬁrms have low productivity and, in turn,
only moderate growth prospects and their internal resources are undiminished by R&D
expenses. These ﬁrms need little external funding and are not credit constrained. They
invest until the rate of return is equal to the user cost of capital, i.e. neoclassical invest-
ment theory applies. Innovative ﬁrms, in contrast, have a large need for external funding
and are, by assumption, credit constrained. Their investment is determined by own re-
sources which are leveraged with external funds up to a maximum limit which depends on
pledgeable future cash-ﬂow. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006), a
ﬁrm’s pledgeable income reﬂects a moral hazard problem with respect to entrepreneurial
and allows ﬁrms to deduct an imputed return on equity in addition to interest on debt. A cash-ﬂow tax
(recommended by Meade, 1978) allows deduction of investment costs upfront but denies any deduction of
ﬁnancing costs ex post. These tax systems were shown to be neutral in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions
(see King, 1975; Sandmo, 1979; Boadway and Bruce, 1984, for models under certainty, and Bond and
Devereux, 1995, 2003, under uncertainty) and feature prominently in the tax reform literature (e.g.
Devereux and Sorensen, 2005; OECD, 2007; Auerbach, Devereux, and Simpson, 2008). We can replicate
these neutrality results as long as ﬁnance constraints are not binding.
3eﬀort. Entrepreneurs need to keep a minimum part of the company’s earnings to assure
their high eﬀort which limits the amount of income that can credibly be promised to banks
and other external investors as a repayment. As a result, banks restrict credit, implying
that a ﬁrm’s investment at the margin is limited by its capacity to leverage own assets
with external credit. Since investment is lower than the unrestricted level, innovative but
ﬁnance constrained ﬁrms generate an excess return on investment.
Our model of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms or, equivalently, of innovative and
standard ﬁrms, allows us to study the eﬀects of tax policy on innovation, capital invest-
ment and welfare. The analysis highlights transmission channels for tax policy that are
entirely diﬀerent across ﬁrms, depending on their ﬁnancing capacity. We derive four novel
results. First, R&D subsidies not only encourage innovation but also boost subsequent ex-
pansion investment. R&D subsidies are an important pillar of innovation policy in many
countries, see OECD (2008), and Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2002) for empirical
evidence how a reduction in R&D costs stimulates R&D. In contrast to the existing liter-
ature which emphasizes innovation spillovers as a rationale for R&D subsidies, the welfare
gains in our model derive from the fact that the subsidy relaxes ﬁnance constraints and
allows ﬁrms with an excess return to exploit investment opportunities to a larger extent.
Second, taxes which are neutral in a neoclassical world, still restrict expansion investment
of constrained ﬁrms by reducing free cash-ﬂow and thereby discourage innovation. Third,
a revenue neutral increase in proﬁtt a x e st oﬁnance larger R&D subsidies redistributes to-
wards innovative ﬁrms and boosts aggregate productivity and welfare. Fourth, a revenue
neutral tax cut cum base broadening policy similarly boosts innovation and welfare.
Existing literature in public economics has analyzed the implications of tax policy
for entrepreneurship and entry in the presence of asymmetric information.2 The present
paper, in contrast, focusses on discrete innovation choice and subsequent expansion in-
2For highly selective references to business taxation under asymmetric information, see Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), De Meza and Webb (1987), Fuest and Tillessen (2005) and the synthesis of Boadway and
Keen (2006) on the eﬀects of taxes on adverse selection and entry, and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004a,b)
on entrepreneurship with moral hazard.
4vestment of ﬁrms. More recently, Chetty and Saez (2009) and Koethenbuerger and Stim-
melmayr (2009) also consider the implications of agency costs on the scale of investment
but take an alternative approach. These papers focus on the role of dividend and corpo-
rate taxes when managers make ineﬃcient investment choices by diverting funds to ‘pet’
projects which do not generate income and yield utility (private beneﬁts) only to managers
but not to shareholders.3 Similarly, studying theft by company insiders, Desai, Dyck, and
Zingales (2007) show that corporate taxes may lead to more theft and diversion of funds
(see also the survey in Desai and Dharmapala, 2008, on the interaction of tax systems
and corporate governance). In these papers, the agency problem is to prevent the misuse
of company funds. We believe that these theories are more descriptive of the behavior of
large unconstrained ﬁrms with free cash-ﬂow that may be misused by corporate insiders.
Our approach, instead, focusses more on the role of ﬁnance constraints for investment of
growth companies that are unable to invest up to the eﬃcient scale because they have
diﬃculty in raising external funds. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is unique in
explaining the coexistence and endogenous composition of constrained and unconstrained
ﬁrms as a result of a discrete innovation decision.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 derives
comparative static results and prepares Section 4 which presents the main results on the
impact of taxes and subsidies in a ﬁnance constrained economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
There is a mass 1 of risk-neutral agents, each endowed with initial assets A per capita.
A ﬁxed fraction E of the population is endowed with entrepreneurial ability and one
3Allocating funds to unproductive pet projects eats up resources and reduces corporate earnings. In
our model, banks’ credit decisions prevent that entrepreneurs enjoy private beneﬁts in equilibrium so
that all resources are productively used.
5investment project. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in the sense that the early stage
success probability q0 ∈ [0,1] of their project may be high or low. With probability 1−q0,
the project fails and the ﬁrm is closed down. The distribution of entrepreneurs with
projects of type q0 is given by G(q0)=
R q0
0 g(˜ q)d˜ q. An entrepreneur earns an expected
proﬁt or surplus πE, giving end of period wealth πE + AR. For entrepreneurship to be
worthwhile, end of period wealth must at least compensate foregone earnings AR from
an alternative capital market investment where r is a safe deposit rate of interest, and
R ≡ 1+r.T h er e m a i n i n gp a r t1 − E of agents have no managerial ability and can only
invest assets on a deposit market, giving end of period wealth and consumption equal to
AR. The deposit rate is ﬁxed on international capital markets.4
Preferences are linearly separable in consumption equal to end of period wealth after
taxes, plus possibly a transfer received from the government, plus the value of leisure
or ‘private beneﬁts’. Managerial misbehavior will be prevented by incentive compatible
lending conditions so that private beneﬁts are not consumed in equilibrium. End of period
utility of an investor is vN = AR while entrepreneurs enjoy per capita expected utility
equal to vE = AR + TE + πE, where expected net proﬁt πE is net of taxes, and TE is a
per capita transfer. Only entrepreneurs invest and are subject to taxes. To isolate the
excess burden from proﬁt taxation and avoid any redistributive issues, we assume that
tax revenue is refunded to entrepreneurs only.
Value maximizing involves several choices during a ﬁrm’s life-cycle. At an early stage,
ﬁrms decide whether or not to undertake a ﬁxed R&D investment k with private cost
(1 − σ)kR where σ is an R&D subsidy and R converts into end of period value. Our
assumptions below imply that innovating ﬁrms will be ﬁnance constrained, indicated by
an index j = c, while standard ﬁrms are unconstrained (index j = u). Hence, private
R&D spending of a type j ﬁrm is kj ∈ {0,(1 − σ)kR}. Innovation has two consequences.
First, R&D spending drains own resources and leaves residual assets Aj = A − kj,w h e r e
4An alternative interpretation is that R is a ﬁxed productivity of a safe Ricardian technology which
converts one unit of the good at the beginning of period into R units at the end of period.
6Ac <A u = A. Second, innovation raises a ﬁrm’s productivity from θu =1to θc = θ>1
and leads them to invest at a larger scale, Ic >I u. For both reasons, innovating ﬁrms
require a larger credit, assuming that expansion investment exceeds own funds. Hence,
a ﬁrm’s productivity determines net output xj = θjf (Ij) from the concave production
technology f0 > 0 >f 00. However, expansion investment is risky and may succeed with a
high or low probability, p>p L. A high success probability is possible only with full eﬀort
of the entrepreneur, while shirking (consuming private beneﬁt s )r e s u l t si nm o r ef r e q u e n t
failure and a lower survival probability. Hence, expansion investment yields output xj
with probability p if eﬀort is high, and nothing when the ﬁrm fails with probability 1−p.
Given higher productivity, innovating ﬁrms invest at a larger scale and are more proﬁtable,
leading to expected net of tax proﬁts πc >π u.
The timing of events is: (i) Project type q0 is revealed; (ii) Depending on q0,t h e
ﬁrm decides on R&D; (iii) If the early stage is successfully completed, the ﬁrm chooses
expansion investment Ij and must raise the required credit Dj = Ij − Aj;( i v )T h e
entrepreneur chooses managerial eﬀort, leading to p when eﬀo r ti sh i g h ,o rpL when private
beneﬁts are enjoyed; (v) The ﬁrm produces output and pays back credit if investment is
successful. The model is solved by backward induction.
Ex ante, entrepreneurs might have a project of any possible type q0. Onlygoodprojects
q0 >qwarrant R&D to obtain a higher productivity and larger net present value πcq0−kc.
Other ﬁrms with low quality projects q0 <qdo not innovate, avoid R&D spending, and



















Once the early stage investment risk is resolved, ﬁrms are fully symmetric within each
group but diﬀer across innovation status.
72.2 Investment and Innovation
When the early stage is successful, the ﬁrm enters the expansion phase and chooses in-
vestment. Innovative ﬁrms have large investment opportunties but are left with little own
assets due to prior R&D spending. Hence, they need a large credit Dc = Ic − Ac.5 Stan-
dard ﬁrms with low productivity optimally invest at a smaller scale, have undiminished
own resources and need a small credit. Since own equity is predetermined and investment
is variable, the marginal source of ﬁnance is debt. The loan rate for risky business debt
is i>r . The government taxes proﬁta tt h er a t eτ but allows deduction of a share λ of
total ﬁnancing costs iIj. The tax liability is Tj = τ (xj − λiIj) if the ﬁrm survives the
expansion stage. Net of the R&D subsidy, the total end of period value of an innovating
ﬁrm’s tax liability is Tc−σkR if it is successful in all stages. Setting λ =1and σ = τ,t h e
system is equivalent to an ACE system.6 The expected proﬁt (or surplus over residual
assets Aj) of an entrepreneur with a type j ﬁrm is
π
e
j = p[Ij + xj − (1 + i)Dj − Tj] − RAj,
π
b
j = p(1 + i)Dj − RDj =0 , (2)
πj = p(Ij + xj − Tj) − RIj.
We assume perfect competition on the external capital market. Hence, in equilibrium, the
competitive loan rate is determined by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o np(1 + i)=R.E x p e c t e d
repayment covers the bank’s reﬁnancing cost on the deposit market. To cover the losses
from credit default, the loan rate must exceed the safe deposit rate. Given that banks make
5We phrase external funding in terms of debt. In this simple two state model, new debt and new
equity are, in fact, equivalent in the absence of tax so that Dj could also be interpreted as new equity.
However, if there is a tax advantage of debt, agents would strictly prefer debt over equity.
6In reality, most often only interest on debt is deductible. The tax liability would be τ (xj − iDj) since
the opportunity cost iAc of equity is not eligible for a deduction. We choose the current formulation partly
for simplicity but also to emphasize that even a ‘neutral’ tax discourages investment of constrained ﬁrms
even if it doesn’t aﬀect the user cost. Alternatively, we could have assumed a cash-ﬂow tax. The results
in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) imply that ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes are equivalent but not neutral.
8zero proﬁts, the entrepreneur appropriates the entire joint surplus of the ﬁrm, πe
j = πj.
Deﬁne the user cost of capital u and write expected net of tax proﬁto fat y p ej ﬁrm as




With an ACE system, the tax has no impact on the user cost, λ =1implies u = i.
Given innovation and investment choices at earlier stages, and a level of external
debt, the entrepreneur will obtain a surplus ve
j ≡ Ij + xj − (1 + i)Dj − Tj if the ﬁrm
survives. If she works hard, the success probability and expected income pve
j will be
high. Alternatively, shirking results in a low survival probability pL <pand a low
expected income pLve
j, but the entrepreneur can enjoy private beneﬁts bIj. The incentive






j + bIj ⇔ v
e
j ≥ βIj,β ≡ b/(p − pL). (4)
Incentive compatibility is assured only if the entrepreneur keeps a minimum stake ve
j ≥ βIj
in the ﬁrm so that the increase in expected income as a return to eﬀort exceeds the
foregone private beneﬁts from shirking. To assure high eﬀort, the level of investment
and, therefore, the size of external debt must not exceed the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income,
(1 + i)Dj ≤ Ij+xj−Tj−βIj. Since we want to focus on equilibria where innovative ﬁrms
are credit constrained and standard ﬁrms are not, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (i) At Iu given by f0 (Iu)=u, the constraint is slack, ve
u (Iu) >β I u.
(ii) At Ic given by θf0 (Ic)=u, the incentive constraint is violated, ve
c (Ic) <β I c.
Assumption (i) means that standard ﬁrms are unconstrained. In maximizing expected
end of period wealth πe
u = pve
u−AR, standard ﬁr m se x p a n du n t i lt h er e t u r no ni n v e s t m e n t
is equal to the user cost of capital,
f




Innovative ﬁrms have less internal assets, Ac = A − (1 − σ)k, but higher productivity
θ>1 than standard ﬁrms. Part (ii) of the above assumption means that they are
9constrained and can not fully exploit their growth potential. Investment is constrained





c =( 1− τ)[θf (Ic) − uIc]+( 1+i)Ac. (6)
Since πe
j = pve
j − AjR = πj,w em u l t i p l yb yp, rewrite the constraint as πj > pβIj − AjR
and illustrate in Figure 1 where unconstrained values are marked by a star.
π () uu I
β − cc pI A R








Fig. 1: Incentive Compatible Investment
At any investment level, expected proﬁto fi n n o v a t i v eﬁrms is larger since they are more
productive as a result of prior R&D (θ>1). Standard ﬁrms invest until expected proﬁt
is at a maximum. They have undiminished wealth A so that the line pβIu − AR starts
out at −AR. Clearly, at the optimal investment level I∗
u, the incentive constraint is slack,
πu (I∗
u) >p β I ∗
u − AR.I f i n n o v a t i v e ﬁrms had no ﬁnancing problem, they would invest
I∗
c to maximize expected proﬁt. However, banks would deny the required funding. They
10anticipate that a debt obligation of this size would violate the entrepreneur’s incentive
constraint so that the loan would be repaid only with a lower probability pL <pand the
bank could not break even with the competitive loan rate i.T h eﬁrm is able to raise credit
only up to Ic − Ac and can invest no more than Ic <I ∗
c where the incentive constraint is
just binding in Figure 1.7
The choice of expansion investment results in proﬁts that ﬁrms can expect conditional
on the level of R&D investment. As Figure 1 illustrates, R&D leads to higher proﬁts but
comes at an additional ﬁxed cost. Firms must decide on their innovation strategy before
the development risk is resolved. They diﬀer by the quality of their business idea which
is reﬂected in a given probability q0 of successfully completing the start-up phase. With
probability 1 − q0,t h eﬁrm fails and closes down. Any R&D investment is lost. Firms of





Firms with better projects q0 >qinvest in R&D, less promising ventures do not. Figure
2 illustrates. At the date of entry when ﬁr m sh a v en o ty e tl e a r n e dt h en a t u r eo ft h e i r
project but know only the distribution of possible types, expected proﬁt is given by (1).
Anticipating subsequent innovation and investment decisions yields
πE = suπu + scπc − sk (1 − σ)kR > 0, (8)
where the ex ante probabilities of innovation sk and of surviving the start-up phase sc




















q [(πc − πu)q0 − (1 − σ)kR]dG(q0) is positive
since the square bracket is zero at the cut-oﬀ but strictly positive for better types. All
7If the ﬁrm asked for a marginally larger credit, banks could still provide credit by discretely raising
the loan rate to iL >iuntil (1 + iL)pL = R.P r o ﬁt ve
c would marginally rise if i were not changed but
falls discretely if the loan rate rises to iL. We must assume pL low enough so that ﬁrms do not prefer
discretely larger credit I∗
c − Ac at iL. An equilibrium with shirking is deﬁnitely not viable if pL → 0.
11potential entrepreneurs strictly prefer entry and invest their wealth A in their own ﬁrm
rather than in the capital market. Out of E start-up ﬁrms, only a part skE invest in
R&D and only sjE survive the start-up phase. Out of these, a fraction 1 − p fails in the
expansion stage, and only a part psjE makes it to the production stage. Appendix A
states conditions that assure an interior solution.
innovative firms standard firms
π ⋅ ' u q
' q
πσ ⋅−− '( 1 ) c qk R
q 1
Fig. 2: Innovation Decision
2.3 General Equilibrium
The government collects taxes from ﬁrms and could use it for public goods or redistributive
transfers. Since the aim of this study is to isolate the eﬃciency implications of proﬁt
taxation in the presence of ﬁnance constraints, we assume here that tax revenues are
refunded back to ﬁrms. At the same time, we assume that these transfers are received in
the private sphere and cannot be pledged to banks to raise larger credit. This assumption
is meant to reﬂect the fact that, in reality, ﬁrms do not receive lump-sum transfers from
t h eg o v e r n m e n tb u to n l yf o rs p e c i ﬁc purposes such as R&D subsidies or infrastructure.
Hence, the entrepreneur’s expected end of period utility is vE = AR+πE+TE. Aggregate
12tax revenue amounts to TEE,o rTE per ﬁrm,
TE =
P
j psjTj − σskkR, Tj = τ (xj − λiIj). (10)
Appendix B states the equilibrium conditions on deposit and output markets. Given a
ﬁxed deposit rate, these conditions are not relevant for further analysis.
3 Comparative Static Analysis
To prepare for the discussion of tax reform, this section develops the comparative statics of
the model. The notation denotes relative changes, e.g. ˆ Ij ≡ dIj/Ij. The usual exceptions
are the change in tax rates ˆ τ ≡ dτ/(1 − τ) and ˆ σ ≡ dσ/(1 − σ). We evaluate all tax
changes starting from an equilibrium with an ACE tax in place, λ =1and σ = τ, implying
a user cost u = i. This assumption not only much simpliﬁes calculations but also helps
to focus on the non-standard eﬀects of tax policy where taxes work not via the user cost
channel but via cash-ﬂow sensitivity of constrained ﬁrms. In considering base broadening
policies, we restrict deductions by setting ˆ λ = dλ < 0 in some scenarios.
3.1 Investment and Proﬁts
Given a constant deposit rate, competition among banks ﬁxes the loan rate i via the zero
proﬁtc o n d i t i o n(1 + i)p = R. Investment of standard ﬁrms responds by (see 5),












In starting from λ =1and u = i, a larger tax rate does not aﬀect the user cost and has
no impact on investment. By the envelope theorem, proﬁt of a standard ﬁrm changes by
dπu = −πu · ˆ τ + τipIu · ˆ λ. (12)
Base broadening (ˆ λ<0) discourages investment while a tax cut (ˆ τ<0)h a sn oe ﬀect
since the tax is neutral in the initial equilibrium. While the tax cut obviously strengthens
expected net of tax proﬁt, base broadening reduces it.
13Given that innovative ﬁrms are constrained, investment is determined by the incentive
constraint in (6) where the entrepreneur’s residual income in the good state after repaying
debt is ve
c =( 1− τ)θf (Ic)−(1 − λτ)iIc+(1 + i)[A − (1 − σ)k]. In taking the diﬀerential,
we evaluate at λ =1 , measure the tightness of the ﬁnance constraint by the excess return
ρ ≡ (1 − τ)(x0
c − i),a n du s eπc =( 1− τ)p(xc − iIc) initially,
ˆ Ic = −
πc
mIc
· ˆ τ +
τipIc
mIc
· ˆ λ +
(1 − σ)kR
mIc
· ˆ σ, m ≡ (β − ρ)p<R . (13)
Assumption m<Rguarantees positive leverage of own assets, dIc/dA > 1.
If the ﬁrm were unconstrained, the investment response would be analoguous to (11).
To compare to the unconstrained case, we rewrite (13) as
ˆ Ic = −φτ · ˆ τ +( uλ + φλ) · ˆ λ + φσ · ˆ σ, (14)











Setting φτ = φλ = φσ =0yields the unconstrained case where ˆ Ic = uλˆ λ and neither
the tax nor the subsidy rate, τ and σ,a ﬀect expansion investment. In this case, the tax
rate is neutral when an ACE system is in place, and the subsidy on ﬁxed R&D spending
doesn’t aﬀect the user cost of investment. When innovative ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained,
investment becomes sensitive to cash-ﬂow. The tax rate reduces future cash-ﬂow and
thereby erodes the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income while the subsidy strengthens residual own
equity Ac after R&D spending. Both a tax cut and a higher subsidy boost the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing capacity and thereby facilitate investment. Note that there is no clear-cut
argument to sign φλ, meaning that the eﬀect of λ m a yb es t r o n g e ro rw e a k e rt h a ni nt h e
unconstrained case. However, the net eﬀe c ti sc l e a r l yp o s i t i v e ,a st h ec o m p a r i s o nw i t h
(13) shows. Broadening the tax base by restricting interest deductions inﬂates the ﬁrm’s
tax liability and reduces investment by draining future cash-ﬂow and pledgeable income.
Starting with λ =1 , the expected proﬁt in (2.2) changes by
dπc = −πc · ˆ τ + τipIc · ˆ λ + ρpIc · ˆ Ic. (15)
14The ﬁrst two terms are structurally identical to (12). However, when investment is con-
strained, the envelope theorem does not apply anymore so that larger investment boosts
proﬁts. The impact on proﬁt is proportional to the excess return ρ>0 which measures
the tightness of the ﬁnance constraint. We summarize:
Proposition 1 (Excess Return) Financially constrained ﬁrms earn a return on invest-
ment in excess of the user cost of capital. Expanding investment raises the joint surplus
πc in the expansion stage.
3.2 Innovation, Productivity and Firm Value
Prior to expansion investment, ﬁrms decide on the (discrete) innovation strategy. R&D
raises future productivity but also drains the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial resources. The return to
innovation consists of the anticipated increase in future proﬁt, but accrues only if a ﬁrm
actually survives. When it fails, the R&D investment is lost. In consequence, innovation
is proﬁtable only for those ﬁrms with the highest survival chances. The cut-oﬀ value q
changes by ˆ q = −dπc−dπu
πc−πu −ˆ σ. Inserting proﬁt changes from (12) and (15) and substituting
the investment response of constrained ﬁrms from (14) yields
ˆ q = ζτ · ˆ τ − ζλ · ˆ λ − ζσ · ˆ σ, (16)





τpi(Ic − Iu)+ρpIc (uλ + φλ)
πc − πu




Obviously, R&D tax credits (or subsidies) boost innovation. Since innovative ﬁrms are
more productive, earn larger proﬁts and invest at a larger scale, a higher tax rate reduces
the share of innovating ﬁrms by raising the innovation threshold. Restricting tax deduc-
tions (ˆ λ<0) triggers the same impact. The innovation response would be qualitatively
the same even if innovative ﬁrms were not constrained (set ρ =0in the elasticities).
Finance constraints merely magnify the response.
15Innovation boosts productivity. There are scpE highly productive, innovative ﬁrms in
the total pool (sc + su)pE, resulting in average productivity θE = sc
sc+suθ + su
sc+su.S i n c e
sc+su is a constant, the composition of ﬁrms changes by dsc = qdsk = −dsu = −q2g(q)ˆ q,
see (9). If more ﬁr m si n n o v a t e( ˆ q<0), average productivity rises by
dθE = −(θ − 1)
q2g(q)
sc + su
· ˆ q. (17)
For a complete welfare analysis of tax policy, one must know the impact on the net
present value πE of a new ﬁrm and on the total net tax liability TE per entrant. Tak-
ing the diﬀerential of (8), expected proﬁt changes by dπE =
P
j sjdπj +( 1− σ)skkRˆ σ
where πudsu + πcdsc − (1 − σ)kRdsk =[ ( πc − πu)q − (1 − σ)kR]dsk =0follows when
using dsc = qdsk = −dsu. A rising cut-oﬀ q implies fewer innovating ﬁrms and lower
productivity. However, on account of innovation choice in (7), a marginal change in ﬁrm
composition does not aﬀect expected total proﬁto fan e wﬁrm. Substituting (12), (14)
and (15) and deﬁning ¯ π ≡ scπc + suπu as well as ¯ I ≡ scIc + suIu yields
dπE = −(¯ π + ρpscIcφτ) · ˆ τ + τpi
¡¯ I + ρpscIc/m
¢
· ˆ λ (18)
: +((1 − σ)skkR+ ρpscIcφσ) · ˆ σ.
The proﬁt elasticities are magniﬁed by the excess return ρ of constrained ﬁrms.
The expected net tax liability is TE =
P
j sjpTj −σkRsk where expected tax pTj of a





with ρu =0and ρc = ρ)
pdTj = πj · ˆ τ − τpiIj · ˆ λ +
τ
1 − τ
pρjIj · ˆ Ij. (19)
Using dsu = q2g(q)ˆ q = −dsc = −qdsk, total net tax TE changes by
dTE =
P
j sj · pdTj − (1 − σ)kRsk · ˆ σ −∇ Tqg(q) · ˆ q, ∇T ≡ p(Tc − Tu)q − σkR,
where ∇T is the change total tax liability when a marginal ﬁrm switches the innovation
mode. Substituting (19) and noting ρu =0yields
dTE =¯ π · ˆ τ − τpi¯ I · ˆ λ − (1 − σ)kRsk · ˆ σ +
τ
1 − τ
pρscIc · ˆ Ic −∇ Tqg(q) · ˆ q. (20)
16The ﬁrst three terms are the direct, mechanical eﬀe c t so fp o l i c yo ne x p e c t e dt a xr e v e n u e
per ﬁrm. The last two terms reﬂect behavioral responses which will be substituted later,
depending on the speciﬁc scenario.
Finally, subsequent analysis will need to sign the term ∇T when an ACE tax is in place
(λ =1and σ = τ). With an ACE tax, gross proﬁts π∗
j = p(xj − iIj) are related to net of
tax proﬁts by πj =( 1− τ)π∗
j. Expected tax liability is pTj = τπ∗
j. The innovation cut-oﬀ
becomes (1 − τ)(π∗
c − π∗
u)q =( 1− τ)kR. Hence, in an equilibrium with an arbitrary tax
r a t ea n da nA C Es y s t e m ,t h et e r m(π∗
c − π∗
u)q is ﬁxed at kR,l e a v i n g




u)q − τkR=0 . (21)
With an ACE system, the change in expected tax liability when a marginal ﬁrm switches
from innovation to the standard technology, is zero. Irrespective of how gross proﬁts π∗
j
change, the cut-oﬀ q must move in a compensating way so that the innovation condition
remains fulﬁlled.
4 Tax Policy and Financial Dependence
4.1 Introducing an R&D Tax Credit
We ﬁrst consider the implications of an R&D tax credit, i.e. a subsidy to private R&D
spending. To isolate the eﬃciency eﬀects, we assume that the subsidy is ﬁnanced by a
lump-sum tax TE (negative transfers) at the end of the period. To be lump-sum, it must
not aﬀect lending decisions of banks and eﬀort choice of entrepreneurs. We thus assume
that this tax is paid in the ‘private sphere’ and does not aﬀect pledgeable income of the
ﬁrm.8 In any case, the scenario is meant to isolate the eﬃciency eﬀects of the subsidy and
8Alternatively, the tax could be imposed on investors who cannot avoid it. It would reduce their
welfare to vN = AR − TN,w i t hﬁscal balance requiring ETE +( 1− E)TN =0 .T o i s o l a t e e ﬃciency
gains, one would consider the change in aggregate welfare V = EvE +( 1− E)vN.
17to clarify the consequences when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained. We also assume τ =0in
this subsection and turn to self-ﬁnanced R&D subsidies in the following subsections.
T h eR & Ds u b s i d yi si r r e l e v a n tf o rs t a n d a r dﬁrms which do not spend on R&D. Both
investment and proﬁts at the expansion stage remain constant, ˆ Iu = dπu =0 .H o w -
ever, the subsidy has interesting and non-trivial implications for the expansion stage of
innovative ﬁrms. The key insight is that R&D spending at an early stage drains internal
resources that are needed to self-ﬁnance part of subsequent expansion investment. The
subsidy thus relaxes the ﬁnancing constraint. By (14-16),
ˆ Ic = φσ · ˆ σ>0,d π c = ρpIcφσ · ˆ σ>0, ˆ q = −ζσ · ˆ σ<0. (22)
By strengthening internal funds, the subsidy allows for more self-ﬁnancing and additional
external leverage of expansion investment. In other words, the R&D subsidy not only
encourages R&D activity but also helps ﬁrms to exploit the new investment opportunities
to a larger extent. This novel role of R&D tax credits also boosts proﬁts in the expansion
stage in proportion to the excess return ρ on constrained investment. This proﬁt gain
would not be present if ﬁrms were unconstrained. In that situation, investment would
be expanded until the marginal return equals the user cost of capital so that the excess
return would be zero. Another consequence of the R&D subsidy is that a larger proﬁt
of an innovative ﬁrm in the expansion stage reinforces the ﬁrm’s incentives to engage in
R&D. This extra proﬁt gain reduces the innovation threshold q beyond the direct eﬀect
of an R&D subsidy. Noting the elasticity ζσ =1+ρpIcφσ/(πc − πu), the direct eﬀect
ˆ q = −ˆ σ is magniﬁed by the increased proﬁtability of innovation when the ﬁrm is able
to exploit subsequent growth opportunities to a larger extent. In consequence, average
factor productivity θE in (17) rises when more ﬁrms innovate.
An R&D subsidy yields a ﬁrst order welfare gain even if the subsidy is small. The
welfare gain arises not because of knowledge spillovers as is traditionally argued. The
present model excludes external eﬀects of R&D. The gains arise because the subsidy
relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and thereby allows innovative ﬁrms to invest more at an
above average, excess return which raises aggregate income. To verify this, read the
18changes in expected proﬁt and required tax revenue to pay for the subsidy from (18)
and (20). Note that the diﬀerential budget cost of one more ﬁrm choosing to innovate is
∇T = −σkR as long as the proﬁt tax rate is zero. Hence, using (22),
dπE =[ ( 1 − σ)kRsk + ρpscIcφσ] · ˆ σ, (23)
dTE = −[(1 − σ)kRsk + σkRqg(q)ζσ] · ˆ σ.
The subsidy boosts proﬁts not only directly by subsidizing private R&D costs but also
indirectly, in proportion to the excess return ρ, by stimulating expansion investment. The
direct tax cost of subsidizing R&D of all innovating ﬁrms is dTE = −(1 − σ)kRskˆ σ.S i n c e
the subsidy reduces the innovation threshold q, the government must subsidize even more
new innovators at an extra budget cost of dTE = σkR· qg(q)ˆ q<0.
Welfare of investors and entrepreneurs is vN = AR and vE = AR + πE + TE, respec-
tively, which yields a utilitarian welfare measure V = EvE +( 1− E)vN. Since investors
are not aﬀected in our scenario, welfare changes in proportion to dvE.A d d i n gu pt h et w o
components in (23) shows that net welfare rises by
dvE = dπE + dTE =[ ρpscIcφσ − σkR· ζσ · qg(q)] · ˆ σ. (24)
In the present model, knowledge spillovers and other external eﬀects of innovation are
exluded by assumption. When ﬁnance constraints are not binding (ρ = φσ =0and
ζσ =1 ), ﬁrms expand investment until the marginal return is equal to the user cost of
capital. Any possible excess return is fully eliminated in equilibrium. Innovation would
be Pareto optimal. Consequently, the optimal subsidy would be zero. Any positive one
would only introduce an excess burden so that welfare would decline in proportion to
the subsidy rate, dvE = −σkRζσqg(q)ˆ σ. In contrast, if innovative growth companies,
characterized by small own resources and large investment opportunities, are ﬁnance
constrained, a subsidy payment of value σkR boosts pledgeable income and allows ﬁrms
to expand investment, not only because of larger own resources but also because of more
external funds. In better exploiting investment opportunities from innovation, these ﬁrms
generate additional net income to society where the proﬁt gains are proportional to the
19excess return ρ = x0
c − i. Clearly, it is welfare improving to introduce a small subsidy
starting from σ =0 , dvE = ρpscIcφσˆ σ>0.A st h er a t eb e c o m e sp o s i t i v ea n dm o r eﬁrms
innovate to capture the subsidy, the standard excess burden kicks in. Further raising
the subsidy becomes ever more costly. Apart from the preexisting size of the subsidy,
the excess burden depends on the magnitude of the innovation elasticity ζσ and the
mass of ﬁrms g(q) which are switching to new R&D activity. In the absence of other
policies, the subsidy would be optimal when the marginal welfare gain in (24) is zero,
i.e. ρpscIcφσ = σkR· ζσ · qg(q) holds. With an optimal subsidy, the marginal gains from
relaxing ﬁnance constraints is balanced by the excess burden. To sum up, we state:
Proposition 2 (R&D Subsidy) An R&D subsidy (i) boosts innovation and augments
the share of constrained ﬁrms; (ii) stimulates investment and proﬁto fc o n s t r a i n e dﬁrms;
and (iii) a small subsidy yields ﬁrst order welfare gains.
4.2 Proﬁt Taxation
To highlight the impact of tax reform on innovation and, thus, on capital investment of
more or less proﬁtable ﬁrms, we ﬁrst study the consequences of introducing an ACE tax
which is deﬁned by λ =1and σ = τ. In extending the ACE system to include a full
tax deduction of innovation costs, the tax would be fully neutral in an unconstrained
equilibrium, not only with respect to equipment investment but also with respect to the
innovation choice.9 Thus, our scenario yields a clear benchmark to isolate the implications
of ﬁnance constraints. Since we want to focus on eﬃciency eﬀects, we follow the approach
in the preceding subsection and refund revenues as transfers TE to entrepreneurs.
Raising the tax rate ˆ τ =ˆ σ and keeping λ =1does not impair investment of standard,
unconstrained ﬁrms, ˆ Iu =0 , since the tax is neutral with respect to the user cost of capital,
u = i. However, being a tax on rent, it squeezes net of tax proﬁts by dπu = −πuˆ τ.I n
contrast, the tax not only reduces proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms but also investment which
9ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes are equivalent in our framework, see Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009).
20is sensitive to cash-ﬂow. Restricting investment further erodes proﬁts in proportion to
the excess return ρ, see (15). For this reason, the tax discriminates against innovative
and more proﬁtable ﬁrms. As a consequence, innovation is discouraged and the share of
constrained ﬁrms falls. Evaluating (16), we compute ˆ q =( ζτ − ζσ)ˆ τ which gives
ˆ Ic = −(φτ − φσ) · ˆ τ<0, ˆ q = ρpIc
φτ − φσ
πc − πu
· ˆ τ>0. (25)
Given the condition for discrete innovation choice in (7), where σ = τ with an ACE tax,
we clearly ﬁnd a positive sign of φτ − φσ =[ ( 1− q)πc + qπu]/(mIc) > 0. Hence, the tax
further constrains investment of innovative ﬁrms and discourages innovation.
To arrive at welfare results, one must derive the change in expected tax revenue and
proﬁt. Noting ∇T =0with an ACE tax, see (21), substitute the investment response in






ρpscIc (φτ − φσ)
¸
· ˆ τ. (26)
T h el a s tt e r mr e ﬂects the loss in revenue when the tax further restricts investment and
additionally reduces proﬁt of constrained ﬁrms in proportion to the excess return. This
behavioral eﬀect would be zero in the absence of ﬁnance constraints (φ-coeﬃcients and ρ
would be zero). For the same reason, this part is absent for unconstrained ﬁrms since the
tax does not aﬀect the user cost. It is also absent when starting with a zero tax rate. At
least for rates not too large, the tax raises revenue by taxing rents.
Finally, we evaluate the change in expected proﬁts in (18)
dπE = −[πE + ρpscIc (φτ − φσ)] · ˆ τ<0. (27)
By the arguments above, the square bracket is clearly positive. The ACE system taxes rent
and squeezes expected proﬁts. Diﬀerent from the standard case, the tax also constrains
investment and thereby destroys unexploited proﬁt opportunities as measured by the
excess return ρ.I tt h u sc u t si n t op r o ﬁts beyond the mere mechanical eﬀect.
In the present scenario, the ACE tax is refunded to the entrepreneurial sector in
order to isolate the eﬃciency eﬀects. As in the preceding subsection, welfare changes in
21proportion to dvE. Given the impact on net of tax expected proﬁts and tax revenue, and
noting ρ =( 1− τ)(x0
c − i), the tax reduces net welfare in proportion to
dvE = dπE + dTE = −(x
0
c − i) · pscIc (φτ − φσ) · ˆ τ<0. (28)
The mechanical eﬀect merely reﬂects redistribution from the entrepreneurial to the public
sector and cancels in the aggregate. However, the behavioral eﬀect strictly reduces welfare
even if tax rates are zero initially! The reason is that even taxing rents tightens the
ﬁnancing constraint of innovative ﬁrms and further reduces investment which is already
constrained in market equilibrium. In the presence of ﬁnancing constraints, welfare is
lower because of proﬁtable but unexploited investment opportunities. Introducing even
a small tax means that society loses even more income by further forfeiting proﬁtable
i n v e s t m e n t s . T h es i z eo ft h ew e l f a r el o s sd e p e n d so nt h ew e i g h to fi n n o v a t i v eﬁrms in
the entire business sector, as indicated by scIc. This welfare loss would not arise if none
of the ﬁrms had any trouble in raising outside funds so that they would invest until the
marginal return is equal to the user cost, x0
c = i. In summing up, we state
Proposition 3 (ProﬁtT a x a t i o n )The consequences of a higher rate of a proﬁtt a x
which is neutral with respect to the user cost of capital, are: (i) the tax is neutral towards
investment of standard ﬁrms but reduces investment of constrained ﬁrms; (ii) it reduces
proﬁts of constrained ﬁrms relatively more than proﬁts of unconstrained ﬁrms and, thereby,
discourages innovation; (iii) it leads to a ﬁrst order welfare loss even for a small rate.
The impact of the tax in an unconstrained economy where none of the ﬁrms is restricted
in external funding, is easily recovered by setting the φ-a n dρ-coeﬃcients to zero. In
this case, traditional theory suggests that the ACE tax is fully neutral. For example,
investment of innovative ﬁrms in (14) would simply be ˆ Ic = uλˆ λ. Neither the ACE tax
rate τ, because it does not change the user cost, nor the upfront subsidy σ, because
expansion investment is not sensitive to cash-ﬂow, would have any impact on investment.
Clearly, individual investments in (25) would be unaﬀected. Given that the mechanical
22eﬀect reduces proﬁts of standard and innovative ﬁr m sa sw e l la sR & Dc o s t sb yt h es a m e
proportion, innovation would not aﬀected either since the threshold q in (25) does not
change. Consequently, the changes in tax revenue and private expected proﬁti n v o l v eo n l y
mechanical eﬀects which cancel and leave a zero impact on aggregate welfare. The tax is
fully neutral in an unconstrained equilibrium.
4.3 Revenue Neutral Tax Reform
Starting from an initial equilibrium with an ACE system (τ = σ>0 and λ =1 , i.e.
R&D spending and ﬁnancing costs are fully deductible), the following subsections discuss
a revenue neutral restructuring of proﬁt taxation that boosts investment, productivity
and welfare. Speciﬁcally, we will exogenously change λ or σ and compute revenue neutral
changes in the tax rate to keep ﬁscal revenue constant. We show how these policies can be
used to relax ﬁnance constraints by implicitly redistributing from standard to innovative
but ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
4.3.1 Self-ﬁnanced R&D Tax Credit
In reality, R&D spending on personnel etc. is tax deductible (σ = τ), but governments
often grant explicit additional subsidies, making σ>τ . W es h o wt h a tt h i sp o l i c yc a n
potentially encourage private R&D spending and innovation based growth even if it is
self-ﬁnanced with a revenue neutral increase in the tax rate. The policy redistributes
towards innovative ﬁrms since the higher tax rate extracts revenue from all ﬁrms while
the subsidy is limited only to those with R&D spending. Set dTE =0in (20) and note
∇T =0as in (21) when an ACE system is in place. Using the deﬁnition of ρ,t h er e q u i r e d
increase in the tax rate is
ˆ τ =  τ,σ · ˆ σ,  τ,σ ≡
(1 − σ)kRsk − τ (x0
c − i)pscIcφσ
¯ π − τ (x0
c − i)pscIcφτ
< 1. (29)
Clearly, a higher R&D subsidy requires a higher tax rate to keep revenues constant. The
tax rate needs to rise relatively less if the elasticity is smaller than one which is guaranteed
23if πE >τ(x0
c − i)pscIc (φτ − φσ) > 0.T h i sc o n d i t i o ni sf u l ﬁlled when the tax rate is small,
τ → 0,o ri ft h eﬁnance constraint on innovative ﬁr m si sw e a k ,φj → 0. The preceding
subsection showed that raising tax revenue with an ACE tax (ˆ τ =ˆ σ) discriminated
against innovative and ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. By way of contrast, the revenue
neutral restructuring of the proﬁt tax in this subsection redistributes in the opposite
direction. While the higher tax rate extracts revenue from all ﬁrms, the disproportionate
increase in the subsidy favors innovative ﬁrms.
How does the policy aﬀect investment, innovation and welfare? With an ACE system
in place, the marginal reform is inconsequential for investment but squeezes proﬁts of
unconstrained ﬁrms, ˆ Iu =0and dπu = −πuˆ τ.F o rc o n s t r a i n e dﬁrms, (14) implies
ˆ Ic =( φσ − φτ τ,σ) · ˆ σ =
(1 − σ)kR− πc τ,σ
mIc
· ˆ σ. (30)
Since πc − (1 − σ)kR =( 1 − q)πc + qπu > 0 by the innovation threshold, raising the
ACE tax (case  τ,σ =1 ) was seen to discriminate against innovative ﬁrms and reduce
their investment. The present scenario, in contrast, may favor innovative ﬁrms and relax
their ﬁnancing constraint since the tax rate rises by a smaller amount. Hence, investment
should become less constrained and expand if redistribution is strong enough,














To see this, get (1 − σ)kR−πc τ,σ =[ ¯ π − πcsk](1− σ)kR/(¯ π − τ (x0
c − i)pscIcφτ).N o t e
πj =( 1− τ)π∗
j which holds with an ACE system in place. Using also the deﬁnition of ¯ π
yields ¯ π −πcsk =( 1− τ)[suπ∗
u − π∗
c (sk − sc)]. Hence, the numerator in (30) is positive if
the condition in (31) holds. The numerator of χ reﬂects the average, early-stage survival
rate of standard ﬁrms while the denominator refers to the average failure rate of innovating
ﬁrms. In our model, innovating ﬁrms are more successful and survive to the market more
frequently than ﬁrms with low productivity. Clearly, the ratio χ increases in the cut-oﬀ
value q, χ0 (q) > 0. If innovation is costly, only few ﬁrms will innovate and the probability
ratio becomes very large, limq→1 χ(q)=∞.F o r a n y g i v e n πj,w em a yh a v eac o s tk
such that the innovation threshold q,g i v e nb y(π∗
c − π∗
u)q = kR when an ACE system
24is in place, comes close to unity. Hence, an equilibrium with relatively few innovating
and many standard ﬁrms implies a very large probability ratio so that the condition is
certainly fulﬁlled. In this case, a higher R&D subsidy self-ﬁnanced with a higher proﬁt
tax rate indeed redistributes towards innovative ﬁrms and thereby relaxes on net their
ﬁnance constraint, making them invest more, ˆ Ic > 0.
Proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms in (15) and the innovation threshold in (16) change by
dπc = −πc · ˆ τ + ρpIc · ˆ Ic, ˆ q = −(1 −  τ,σ) · ˆ σ −
ρpIc
πc − πu
· ˆ Ic. (32)
The policy is much more favorable to innovative ﬁr m st h a na ni n c r e a s ei nt h eA C Et a x
since it boosts investment which yields an excess return to these ﬁrms. On net, the
detrimental eﬀect on proﬁts is much reduced. For this reason, the innovation threshold
strongly falls, not only because it directly beneﬁts innovative ﬁrms ( τ,σ < 1). It also
boosts investment which strengthens proﬁts of innovative relative to standard ﬁrms and
induces additional innovation. Average productivity θE rises on this account.
Since the tax reform is revenue neutral, dTE =0 , welfare of entrepreneurs changes in
line with net expected proﬁt, dvE = dπE. Evaluating (18) results in
dπE = [((1 − σ)skkR− ¯ π τ,σ)+ρpscIc (φσ − φτ τ,σ)] · ˆ σ. (33)
Under the conditions mentioned above, the policy stimulates investment of constrained
ﬁrms, ˆ Ic =( φσ − φτ τ,σ)ˆ σ>0, which earns an excess proﬁt and translates into higher
expected proﬁt πE. When starting from an untaxed equilibrium,  τ,σ =( 1− σ)kRsk/¯ π so
that the ﬁrst bracket is seen to be zero. A small self-ﬁnancing R&D subsidy thus boosts
expected proﬁt and welfare by the second term. With a positive tax rate, substitute  τ,σ
and use the φ-coeﬃcients in the numerator to get
(1 − σ)skkR− ¯ π τ,σ =( ¯ π − πcsk) ·
τ (x0
c − i)psc (1 − σ)kR/m
¯ π − τ (x0
c − i)pscIcφτ
,
which is positive by (31). Hence, with few innovative and many standard ﬁrms, the
condition on χ(q) is satisﬁed so that a self-ﬁnanced R&D subsidy is welfare improving.
25If all ﬁrms were unconstrained, all coeﬃcients in (33) would be zero. In the absence of
ﬁnancial frictions, the ACE system would support a Pareto-optimal allocation so that a
marginal, self-ﬁnanced increase in the R&D subsidy would have a zero welfare eﬀect!
Proposition 4 (R&D Tax Credit) A revenue neutral increase in the R&D tax credit,
leading to a subsidy larger than the tax rate, (i) redistributes towards innovative and
constrained ﬁrms and boosts innovation. (ii) If there are relatively few innovative ﬁrms,
the tax credit also stimulates investment of constrained ﬁrms and, (iii) yields ﬁrst order
welfare gains relative to non-discriminatory taxation.
4.3.2 Tax Cut Cum Base Broadening
Tax cut cum base broadening restricts interest deductions (lower λ) to broaden the tax
base and uses the extra revenue to cut the tax rate. While restricting interest deductions
hurts all ﬁr m s ,t h et a xc u tf a v o r si n n o v a t i v eﬁrms. The tax cut boosts proﬁts but not
investment of standard ﬁrms since investment of these ﬁrms exclusively depends on user
costs which do not change when an ACE system is in place. In contrast, the tax cut
stimulates investment when it is sensitive to cash-ﬂow, and therefore disproportionately
boosts proﬁts of innovating ﬁrms. Considering both measures together, the policy clearly
retards investment of standard ﬁrms but holds a priori ambiguous incentives for innovating
ﬁrms. We now show that the net investment response of constrained ﬁr m si sp o s i t i v e .
Limiting interest deductions ˆ λ<0 broadens the tax base and allows for a lower tax rate
such that ﬁscal revenue stays constant, dTE =0 . When an ACE system is in place (σ = τ
and λ =1 ), the initial equilibrium implies ρ =( 1− τ)(x0
c − i) and πj =( 1− τ)π∗
j,w h e r e
π∗
j = p(xj − iIj),w h i c hl e a d st o¯ π =( 1− τ)¯ π∗ and TE = τ (¯ π∗ − skkR). Evaluating (20),
noting (14), and using ∇T =0as shown in (21) yields
ˆ τ =  τ,λ· ˆ λ,  τ,λ ≡ τ ·
pi¯ I − (x0
c − i)pscIc · (uλ + φλ)
¯ π − τ (x0
c − i)pscIc · φτ
. (34)
Since uλ + φλ = τip/m, the elasticity  τ,λ is clearly positive as long as the excess return
and the tax rate are not too large.
26A lower deduction (ˆ λ<0) raises the user cost of capital, thereby harming standard
investment. Innovative ﬁrms must also cut investment, as the inﬂated tax bill squeezes
pledgeable income and thereby limits external funding. The marginal investment reduc-
tion has no eﬀect on proﬁts of standard ﬁrms but strictly reduces proﬁts of constrained
ﬁrms and thus the tax base. For this reason, the budget neutral cut in the tax rate is
smaller than the pure mechanical eﬀect would suggest. On the other hand, the lower tax
rate has just the opposite eﬀect. It boosts investment and proﬁts of constrained ﬁrms and
thereby augments the tax base so that the reduction in the tax rate can be even larger.
The total impact is a magniﬁcation of the direct eﬀect without tax base adjustments if
 τ,λ >τp i¯ I/¯ π which holds if (x0
c − i)pscIcτ
£
τpi¯ Iφτ − ¯ π(uλ + φλ)
¤
> 0. After substituting

















The last paragraph of Appendix A shows that the average rent per unit of capital is larger
for constrained ﬁrms. Hence, with an ACE system in place, the square bracket is positive.
The inequalities πc/Ic > ¯ π/¯ I>π u/Iu hold since ¯ π/¯ I is an average.10 This proves the
magniﬁcation eﬀect. If investment were unconstrained, x0
c = i and πj/Ij =¯ π/¯ I,t h e r e
would be no magniﬁcation eﬀect, leaving  τ,λ = τpi¯ I/¯ π>0 only.
Investment of standard ﬁrms does not depend on the tax rate since the tax is neutral
at the outset. On the other hand, base broadening by restricting interest deductions
harms investment by ˆ Iu = uλˆ λ<0 as in (11). However, this marginal reduction of
standard investment reduces neither proﬁts nor welfare. When innovative ﬁrms are ﬁnance
constrained, the tax cut cum base broadening policy boosts investment of these ﬁrms
(evaluate 14 and use the φ-coeﬃcients) if
ˆ Ic =[ uλ + φλ − φτ τ,λ] · ˆ λ = −
πc τ,λ− τipIc
mIc







To see the sign restriction, note the magniﬁcation eﬀect  τ,λ >τ p i ¯ I/¯ π.T h e n u m e r a t o r
thus yields πc τ,λ − τipIc >π c
τpi¯ I
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> 0.S i n c e( 3 5 )m u s th o l d ,













27the revenue neutral tax cut cum base broadening policy boosts investment of innovative
ﬁrms if they are ﬁnance constrained. In the unconstrained case with φ-coeﬃcients being
zero, investment would decline by ˆ Ic = uλˆ λ<0. The tax cut cum base broadening policy
would impair investment of both innovative and standard ﬁrms.
In stimulating constrained investment which earns an excess return, the policy also
favors proﬁts of innovative relative to standard ﬁrms and, thereby, makes R&D spending
more attractive. The innovation threshold falls by
ˆ q =( ζτ τ,λ− ζλ) · ˆ λ<0 ⇔ πc/Ic > ¯ π/¯ I>π u/Iu. (37)
To prove this, use  τ,λ >τp i¯ I/¯ π, substitute the ζ-a n dφ-coeﬃcients and get






















where ¯ I/¯ π−(Ic − Iu)/(πc − πu)=
£¡








/[(πc − πu)¯ π]
is positive in the constrained equilibrium. In the unconstrained case,  τ,λ = τpi¯ I/¯ π and
ρ =0so that the above equation would become ζτ τ,λ − ζλ = τpi
h
¯ I




average rents πj/Ij would be identical across ﬁrm types. Again, the same policy would
have no impact on innovation in the absence of ﬁnance constraints.
Finally, given revenue neutrality, welfare changes in proportion to net expected proﬁt.
Evaluating (18) and using ˆ τ =  τ,λˆ λ yields
dπE = −
£¡
 τ,λ− τpi¯ I/¯ π
¢
¯ π + ρpscIc · (φτ τ,λ− uλ − φλ)
¤
· ˆ λ>0, (38)
where φτ τ,λ − uλ − φλ > 0 was already shown in (36) while the magniﬁcation eﬀect
 τ,λ >τ p i ¯ I/¯ π holds by (35). Hence, all terms in the square bracket are positive in the
constrained equilibrium. The tax cut cum base broadening policy thus boosts welfare.
The unconstrained equilibrium, in contrast, is characterized by  τ,λ = τpi¯ I/¯ π and ρ =0 ,
implying a zero welfare eﬀect to the ﬁr s to r d e r . T h ew e l f a r er e s u l ti si n t u i t i v e l yc l e a r
when recognizing that the only distortion in the present model is the ﬁnance constraint
on expansion investment of innovative ﬁrms. Since the policy relaxes this constraint, it
28allows for more investment of innovative ﬁrms and, thereby, creates net income gains in
proportion to the excess return of these companies.11
Proposition 5 (Tax Cut Cum Base Broadening) Starting with undistorted user
costs of capital, a smaller deduction of ﬁnancing costs and a revenue neutral cut in the tax
rate redistributes towards innovative ﬁr m sa n d( i )b o o s t si n n o v a t i o n ;( i i )r a i s e s( r e d u c e s )
investment of constrained (unconstrained) ﬁrms; and (iii) raises welfare.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Even in advanced economies with a well developed ﬁnancial sector, many ﬁrms — and
typically the most innovative ones — tend to be ﬁnancially constrained for several reasons.
First, they often spend considerable resources on R&D which drains own funds available
for self-ﬁnancing of equipment investment and restricts external leverage. Secondly, be-
cause they are more innovative, they have more proﬁtable investment opportunities and
need large external funds to grow. Finally, these ﬁrms are often closely held companies
driven by entrepreneurs who possess key technological know-how and inalienable human
capital. Since their input is essential for the development of the company, they must
keep a large enough stake to assure full eﬀort and commitment to the ﬁrm. However, the
entrepreneur’s stake subtracts from pledgeable income that can be promised to external
investors as a credible repayment and thereby limits the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing capacity. In
contrast to standard ﬁrms, constrained innovative ﬁrms earn a return in excess of the
user cost of capital because the limited capacity for external ﬁnancing prevents them to
fully exploit the opportunities to invest. Stimulating investment of constrained ﬁrms thus
boosts income and welfare in the economy.
11Substituting coeﬃcients, we can show the ﬁrst term in (38) to be proportional to the excess return,




πc/Ic − ¯ π/¯ I
¢
τpi¯ I/m
[¯ π − (x0
c − i)pscIc · τφτ]¯ π
.
29The presence of constrained ﬁrms has important implications for tax policy. While
taxes aﬀect investment of standard ﬁrms via the traditional user cost channel, user costs
and eﬀective marginal tax rates are not relevant for constrained ﬁrms. Instead, invest-
ment becomes sensitive to future cash-ﬂow and own internal resources which determine
possible external funding. In this paper, we have proposed a framework of heterogeneous
ﬁrms where an early stage R&D decision endogenously divides the business sector into
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. We have found, among others, the following novel
results on the eﬀects of business taxation: First, R&D subsidies not only encourage inno-
vation but also relax ﬁnance constraints and help innovative ﬁrms to exploit investment
opportunities to a larger extent. Second, introducing a proﬁt tax which would be neutral
in the neoclassical world, restricts expansion investment of constrained ﬁrms by reducing
free cash-ﬂow and thereby discourages innovation. Even a small tax reduces welfare to the
ﬁrst order. Third, a revenue neutral increase in proﬁtt a x e st oﬁnance larger R&D sub-
sidies redistributes towards innovative ﬁrms and may boost aggregate productivity and
welfare. Finally, a revenue neutral tax cut cum base broadening policy similarly favors
constrained ﬁrms and boosts innovation and welfare.
Appendix
A Interior Solution: An interior solution as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 is guaranteed
by suitable parameter restrictions. We restrict k, A, θ,a n dβ such that four conditions are
fulﬁlled: (i) standard ﬁrms are not constrained; (ii) innovative ﬁrms are credit constrained;
(iii) innovative ﬁrms invest more than standard ﬁrms, Ic >I u; and (iv) only a share of
ﬁrms chooses R&D, 0 <q<1. The diﬀerence AR − AcR on the vertical axis of Figure 1
corresponds to the ﬁxed R&D cost (1 − σ)kR. For any given θ,o n ec a ns e tA(θ), k(θ)
and β (θ) to satisfy the ﬁrst three restrictions. Figure 1 illustrates a representative case
where necessarily πc >π u on account of θ>1. As a last step, we vary θ to obtain a
proﬁtd i ﬀerential πc −πu such that q<1 in (7). In subsequent analysis, we also compare
constrained allocations Ic <I ∗
c with unconstrained ones, Ic = I∗
c. If not constrained,
30innovative ﬁrms choose I∗
c instead of Ic as given by (6). Holding all other parameters
constant, this case can always be created by reducing β which reﬂects the beneﬁts of
shirking. The upward sloping broken lines in Figure 1 would become ﬂatter.
We also show for subsequent analysis that, for the case of an isoelastic technology x =
θf (I) with f (I)=Iα and 0 <α<1,t h ea v e r a g er e n t˜ πj ≡ (1 − τ)[θjf (Ij) − uIj]/Ij
per unit of capital is larger for innovative and ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, ˜ πc > ˜ πu.N o t e





= u implies I∗
c >I ∗
u. Obviously, investment rises with productivity, dI∗
c/dθ =


















=( 1− τ)u(1 − α)/α is independent of θ.I fa l lﬁrms
were unconstrained, the productive ones would invest more but have the same rent ˜ π per
unit of capital. However, when investment of innovative ﬁrms with given productivity θ
is constrained below the optimal level, average rent of these ﬁr m sb e c o m e sh i g h e rs i n c e
˜ π0 (I)=−(1 − τ)θ[f (I) − If0 (I)]/I2 < 0 by concavity. The envelope theorem does not
hold since the marginal return is not equal to the user cost. Hence, restraining investment
boosts average rent, ˜ πc > ˜ πu.
B Capital and Output Market Equilibrium: Deposit market equilibrium requires
A(1 − E)+Ac (sk − sc)E + A(1 − sk − su)E =
P
j (Ij − Aj)sjE + σkskE + Z.T h e
left hand side states supply of loanable funds consisting of (i) savings of 1 − E investors;
(ii) residual savings Ac = A − (1 − σ)k of failed innovators; and (iii) savings A of failed
standard ﬁrms. Demand on the right hand side consists of (i) credits for expansion
investment of both types of ﬁrms; (ii) public debt to pay R&D subsidies at the beginning
of period; and (iii) investments in international bonds or in a safe Z-technology, see the
ﬁrst paragraph of Section 2.1. Rearranging yields
A − K · E = Z, K ≡ skk +
P
j sjIj, (A.1)
where K denotes total investment per ﬁrm. If r is the ﬁxed productivity of a safe Ri-
cardian technology, then Z is residual savings invested in the Ricardian sector. If r is
31an internationally ﬁxed deposit rate, Z denotes capital exports or imports, depending on
whether national savings A exceed or fall short of national investment KE.
Private consumption is equal to end of period wealth Y =( AR + πE + TE)E +
AR(1 − E) of investors and entrepreneurs. Substituting πE and TE and other deﬁn-
itions such as πj + pTj = p(Ij + xj) − IjR and K,d e ﬁning aggregate output of the
entrepreneurial sector X ≡
P
j p(Ij + xj)sjE, and using (A.1) yields the output market
condition Y = ZR+X.I fZR i se n do fp e r i o do u t p u tf r o mi n v e s t m e n t si nt h eR i c a r d i a n
technology, then consumption Y is equal to aggregate sectoral output. Alternatively, the
output market condition can be stated as Y − X = ZR where imports Y − X is paid by
foreign source earnings on capital exports Z.
References
[1] Aghion, Philippe, Thibault Fally, and Stefano Scarpetta (2007), Credit Constraints
as a Barrier to the Entry and Post-entry Growth of Firms, Economic Policy, October
2007, 731-779.
[2] Audretsch, David B. (2002), The Dynamic Role of Small Firms: Evidence from the
U.S., Small Business Economics 18,1 3 - 4 0 .
[3] Auerbach, Alan J. (1983), Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of
Capital, Journal of Economic Literature 21,9 0 5 - 9 4 0 .
[4] Auerbach, Alan J., Michael P. Devereux, and Helen Simpson (2008), Taxing Corpo-
rate Income, Paper prepared for The Mirrlees Review, "Reforming the Tax System
for the 21st Century".
[5] Beck, Thorsten and Asli Demirgüc-Kunt (2006), Small and Medium-size Enterprises:
Access to Finance as a Growth Constraint, Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2931-
2943.
[6] Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic (2005), Financial
and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?, Journal of Finance 60,
137-177.
[7] Bloom, Nick, Rachel Griﬃth and John Van Reenen (2002), Do R&D Tax Credits
Work? Evidence from a Panel of Countries 1979-1997, Journal of Public Economics
85,1 - 3 1 .
32[8] Boadway, Robin and Michael Keen (2006), Financing and Taxing New Firms under
Asymmetric Information, FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis 62,4 7 1 - 5 0 2 .
[9] Boadway, Robin and Neil Bruce (1984), A General Proposition on the Design of a
Neutral Business Tax, Journal of Public Economics 24, 231-239.
[10] Bond, Stephen R. and Michael P. Devereux (1995), On the Design of a Neutral
Business Tax under Uncertainty, Journal of Public Economics 58,5 7 - 7 1 .
[11] Bond, Stephen R. and Michael P. Devereux (2003), Generalised R-based and S-based
Taxes under Uncertainty, Journal of Public Economics 87, 1291-1311.
[12] Calomiris, Charles W. and R. Glenn Hubbard (1995), Internal Finance and Invest-
ment: Evidence from the Undistributed Proﬁts Tax of 1936-37, Journal of Business
68, 443-482.
[13] Carpenter, Robert E. and Bruce C. Petersen (2002), Is the Growth of Small Firms
Constrained by Internal Finance?, Review of Economics and Statistics 84,2 9 8 - 3 0 9 .
[14] Carree, Martin A. and Roy A. Thurik (2003), The Impact of Entrepreneurship on
Economic Growth, in: Z.J. Acs and D.B. Audretsch (eds.), Handbook of Entrepre-
neurship Research, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 437-471.
[15] Chetty, Raj and Emmanuel Saez (2009), Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an
Agency Model of the Firm, American Economic Journal: Public Policy,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[16] Chirinko, Robert S. and Huntley Schaller (1995), Why Does Liquidity Matter in
Investment Equations?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27,5 2 7 - 5 4 8 .
[17] De Meza, David and David Webb (1987), Too Much Investment: A Problem of
Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102,2 8 1 - 2 9 2 .
[18] Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala (2008), Tax and Corporate Governance:
An Economic Approach, in: Schön, W. (ed.), Tax and Corporate Governance.B e r l i n :
Springer, 13-30.
[19] Desai, Mihir A., Alexander Dyck, and Luigi Zingales (2007), Theft and Taxes, Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 84,5 9 1 - 6 2 3 .
[20] Devereux, Michael P. and Peter B. Sorensen (2005), The Corporate Income Tax:
International Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform, Paper prepared for the
Working Party No. 2 of the Committee of Fiscal Aﬀairs of the OECD.
[21] Fazzari, Steven M. and Bruce C. Petersen (1993), Working Capital and Fixed In-
vestment: New Evidence on Financing Constraints, Rand Journal of Economics 24,
328-342.
[22] Fuest, Clemens and Philipp Tillessen (2005), Why do Governments Use Closed Ended
Subsidies to Support Entrepreneurial Investment?, Economics Letters 89, 24-30.
33[23] Guiso, Luigi (1998), High-tech Firms and Credit Rationing, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 35,3 9 - 5 9 .
[24] Hall, Robert E. and Dale W. Jorgensen (1967), Tax Policy and Investment Behavior,
American Economic Review 57,3 9 1 - 4 1 4 .
[25] Hall, Bronwyn H. and Josh Lerner (2009), The Financing of R&D and Innovation,
NBER WP 15325.
[26] Hassett, Kevin E. and R. Glenn Hubbard (2002), Tax Policy and Business Invest-
ment, in: A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics,
Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1293-1343.
[27] Himmelberg, Charles P. and Bruce C. Petersen (1994), R&D and Internal Finance:
A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, Review of Economics and
Statistics 76,3 8 - 5 1 .
[28] Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1997), Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112,6 6 3 - 6 9 1 .
[29] Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1991), Corporate Structure,
Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106,3 3 - 6 0 .
[30] Hubbard, Glenn (1998), Capital Market Imperfections and Investment, Journal of
Economic Literature 36,1 9 3 - 2 2 5 .
[31] Hyytinen, Ari and Otto Toivanen (2005), Do Financial Constraints Hold Back In-
novation and Growth? Evidence on the Role of Public Policy, Research Policy 34,
1385-1403.
[32] Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991), Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax for the
1990s, Commentary 26, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
[33] Jaramillo, Fidel, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Weiss (1996), Capital Market Im-
perfections before and after Financial Liberalization: An Euler Equation Approach
to Panel Data for Ecuadorian Firms, Journal of Development Economics 51,3 6 7 - 3 8 6 .
[34] Keuschnigg, Christian and Soren Bo Nielsen (2004a), Start-ups, Venture Capitalists,
and the Capital Gains Tax, Journal of Public Economics 88, 1011-1042.
[35] Keuschnigg, Christian and Soren Bo Nielsen (2004b), Progressive Taxation, Moral
Hazard, and Entrepreneurship, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6, 471-490.
[36] Keuschnigg, Christian and Evelyn Ribi (2009), Proﬁt Taxation and Finance Con-
straints, CEPR DP 7433.
[37] King, Mervyn A. (1975), Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of
Capital: A Comment, Journal of Public Economics 4,2 7 1 - 2 7 9 .
34[38] Koethenbuerger, Marko and Michael Stimmelmayr (2009), Corporate Taxation and
Corporate Governance, Working Paper, Copenhagen and Munich.
[39] Kortum, Sam and Josh Lerner (2000), Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital
to Innovation, RAND Journal of Economics 31, 674-692.
[40] Meade, James E. (1978), The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation. London:
George Allen and Unwin.
[41] OECD (2007), Fundamental Reform of Corporate Income Tax, OECD Tax Policy
Studies No. 16. Paris: OECD.
[42] OECD (2008), OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook.P a r i s :O E C D .
[43] Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (1998), Financial Dependence and Growth,
American Economic Review 88,5 5 9 - 5 8 6 .
[44] Roper, Stephen (1997), Product Innovation and Small Business Growth: A Com-
parison of the Strategies of German, U.K. and Irish Companies, Small Business
Economics 9,5 2 3 - 5 3 7 .
[45] Sandmo, Agnar (1979), A Note on the Neutrality of the Cash Flow Corporation Tax,
Economics Letters 4,1 7 3 - 1 7 6 .
[46] Schaller, Huntley (1993), Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints, and Cana-
dian Investment, Canadian Journal of Economics 26,5 5 2 - 5 7 4 .
[47] Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, American Economic Review 71,3 9 3 - 4 1 0 .
[48] Tirole, Jean (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
[49] Ughetto, Elisa (2009), Industrial Districts and Financial Constraints to Innovation,
International Review of Applied Economics 23,5 9 7 - 6 2 4 .
35